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Health Insurer's Use of Genetic Information:
A Missouri Perspective on a Changing

Regulatory Landscape
Robert H. Jerry,11 *
At the dawn of the new millennium, the mysteries of the human genome'
are being revealed: A working draft of ninety percent of the human genome
sequence is expected to be completed by mid-2000, five years ahead of
schedule.2 Few endeavors in human history have promised so much while
causing so much concern. Miraculous solutions to dreaded diseases seem within

• Missouri Endowed Floyd R. Gibson Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia
School of Law. The Author thanks David Hyman, Sylvia Lazos, and Philip Peters for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts, as well as those who attended the Author's
presentation of some portions of the Article at the 20th Annual Health Law Teachers
Conference on June 5, 1999, in St. Louis, Missouri. He also expresses appreciation to
Janusz Puzniak, Lisa Chase, Gary Linder, and Jeff Laswell for their excellent research
assistance and to the trust of the Gibson Professorship for its support during the
preparation of this Article.
1. According to the Encyclopedia ofHuman Biology, the human genome:
[C]ontains the hereditary information necessary to specify the human
organism. This information is encoded in the sequence of some 3 billion
nucleotide subunits composing the DNA in the nuclei of human haploid cells.
Over 99% of this sequence is identical in all humans and distinguishes us as
a species from other organisms; differences at various points in the other 1%
ensure that no two individuals, except identical twins, have exactly the same
genetic complement and account for the extensive inherited variation seen in
the human population.
Philip Green, Human Genome, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN BIOLOGY 617 (2d ed. 1997).
For a recent discussion of a variety of issues associated with advances in genetic
technology, see Symposium, Genetic Technology: Social Values & PersonalAutonomy

in the 21st Century, 34 WAKE FORESTL. REv. 557 (1999).
2. Charles W. Henderson, Human Genome SequenceAlmost 90 PercentComplete,
GENE THERAPY WKLY., July 26, 1999, available in 1999 WL 11598526 (citing Dr.
Francis Collins, Director of the U.S. National Human Genome Research Institute).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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reach, but the largely unknown consequences of genetic manipulation of life on
this planet cast long shadows on the public's enthusiasm for these remarkable
discoveries. When measured against the international turmoil caused by
disagreements over genetically engineered agricultural products3 and the
widespread fear of the prospect of human cloning, 4 the implications of the new
genetic knowledge for the insurance business seem tame by comparison.
Currently, no health insurers are known to use genetic information 5 in
underwriting decisions.' But the implications of genetic information for

3. See, e.g., EU/US: Washington Recoils from Gene Food Fight, EUROPEAN
REPORT, July 28, 1999 (U.S. Secretary of Agriculture wams that EU's de facto

moratorium on genetically modified crops may undermine the launch of the autumn 1999
talks of the World Trade Organization); Gerber Vows to Stop Using Bioengineered
Products,SAN DIEGo UNION & TRiB., July 31, 1999, at A10 (largest maker of baby food
in U.S. announces that it is dropping suppliers who use genetic engineering in corn and
soybean products); Jeffrey Kluger, Atlantic Food Fight: The Battle Heats up between
the U.S. and Europe over Genetically Engineered Crops, TIME, Sept. 13, 1999, at 42
(discussing the continuing trade dispute over genetically modified food products); US,
France Try to Ward OffBiotechnology Dispute,AM. POL. NETWORK-GREENWIRE, June
30, 1999, at 25 (U.S. Agriculture Secretary, after meeting with French Agriculture
Minister, states that closure ofEU markets to genetically modified crops could case "train
wreck between the US and Europe on biotechnology").
4. In a recent poll of 1,264 adult Americans, 60% said they "dread" the thought of
living in the world when human cloning is a reality. See August Gribbin, 40 Percent of
Americans FearMajor War, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1999, at A4 (reporting on poll
conducted by Peter Hart for Shell Oil Company on Americans' thoughts about the
future); see also Kevin Coughlin, The PrecautionaryPrinciple: We can Clone Sheep,
CreateSuper Crops andSee Your Genetic Future. But should we? Some say it's time
to stop and think, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July 25, 1999, at 1 (reporting on social
concerns about cloning and other kinds of genetic engineering).
5. Definitions are important, as the discussion of the regulatory landscape, infra,
makes clear. See infra text accompanying notes 23-25, 50-59. Family history is, of
course, a kind of genetic information, and family history has been a routine part of
insurance underwriting in the personal lines for decades.
6. See Mark. A. Hall, Legal Rules and Industry Norms: The Impact of Laws
RestrictingHealthInsurers'UseofGeneticInformation,40 JIURMETRICSJ. (forthcoming
Fall, 1999). Based on surveys conducted in seven states of insurance regulators,
insurance company officials, insurance agents, genetic counselors, patient advocates, and
others, Professor Hall concludes that "genetic discrimination by health insurers is very
low or nonexistent, both before these laws were enacted and afterwards, and both in
states with and without these laws." Id. (manuscript at 8). Although some prior research
documented employers and insurers using genetic information to deny or limit coverage
or raise insurance rates, Id. (manuscript at 2 n.5), Professor Hall's detailed assessment
of the data indicates that most of these cases either involved existing symptoms rather
than predictive genetic information, did not involve health insurance, or related to the
"coverage ofgenetic services rather than the availability and pricing of health insurance."
Id. (manuscript at 16). Although Professor Hall's research is the most careful on the
subject to date, it is consistent with the sentiments of earlier commentators who have
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/1
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underwriting practices were recognized early on, and the result has been a
voluminous quantity of scholarly and popular literature on the significance of
genetic information for both the insurance industry and those who purchase its
products!
Given what has already been written about genetic testing and insurance,
one might fairly wonder if anything remains to be said about a largely
nonexistent business practice. As it turns out, the regulatory landscape for
insurers' use of genetic information underwent considerable change during the
1990s at both federal and state levels, making it appropriate to revisit this terrain
and describe its new contours. Furthermore, in 1999, Missouri joined a majority

some familiarity with the practices of health insurers. See, e.g., Richard E. Braun,
Keeping Life InsuranceAffordable in the Era of Genetic Medicine, 53 J. FIN. SERV.
PROFS. 46 (1999), available in 1999 WL 1131096 ("[I]nsurers are not interested in
screening tests for conditions that are rare, that do not affect mortality, or that would not
lead to significant anti-selection. For that reason, insurers do not use any of the existing
conventional screens for heritable diseases."); William J. Warfel et al., Genetic
Information and Risk Classificationin IndividualLife and Health Insurance,52 J. AM.
Soc'Y CLU & CHFC 44 (1998), availablein 1998 WL 27615690 (stating that "it appears
that insurers currently do not require genetic testing, do not use it in the underwriting
process, and rarely encounter genetic testing information on applications"); No Insurance
Discrimination,APPLIED GENECNEWS, June 1, 1999, availablein 1999 WL 12885741
("Contrary to general concern, a recent study [performed by Myriad Genetics] suggested
that insurance companies do not discriminate based on genetic tests that show that a
particular patient has a [sic] increased risk of developing cancer."); Chuck Jones,
InsurersInterestedin Gene Testingfor Underwriting;Agents Not So Sure, LIFE ASS'N
NEws, April 1, 1998, at 44 ("There are no insurance companies currently using genetic
tests in their underwriting of life or health coverage"); Joanne Denise, Testimony before
the Committee on Labor, U.S. Senate, 144 Cong. Rec. D545-02, D549 (1998), full
transcript availablein 1998 WL 11518495 (reporting on survey of members of National
Association of Health Underwriters which found no health insurers asking questions
about genetic testing on an application for health insurance). For predictions on the
availability of genetic testing in the future, see infra note 31.
7. See, e.g., THOMAS H. MURRAY ET AL., THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT AND THE
FuTuRE OF HEALTH CARE (1996) (nine essays examining the Genome Project and how
it might affect health care); Roberta M. Berry, The Human Genome Projectand the End
ofInsurance,7 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 205 (1996); Mark A. Hall, Insurers' Use of
GeneticInformation, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 13 (1996) (surveying arguments for and against
allowing insurers to use genetic information; bibliographic information contained in
footnotes); Eric Holmes, Solving the Insurance/GeneticFair/UnfairDiscrimination
Dilemma in Light of the Human Genome Project, 85 KY. L. J. 503 (1997); Mark A.
Rothstein, Genetic Privacy and Confidentiality: Why They Are So Hardto Protect,26
J. L. MED. & ETHICS 198 (1998) (discussing health insurance, life insurance, and
employment issues); Robert H. Jerry, II, Genetic Testing and Health Insurance:
Regulatory Summary andBibliography,June 5, 1999 (paper accompanying presentation
at 20th Annual Health Law Teachers Conference in St. Louis, Missouri; contains
extensive bibliography of articles, essays, congressional materials, and internet materials;
on file with the MissouriLaw Review).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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of states that have placed limitations upon health insurers' use of genetic
information. This Article examines these new developments in federal and state
statutory law and considers whether the regulatory regime is adequate to achieve
its communitarian objectives. Specifically, Part I provides a narrative
explanation of the significance of genetic information in health insurance. The
hypothetical presented in this part illuminates the rationales for existing
regulations and illustrates how the availability of information alters the ways in
which individuals respond to risk, which in turn affects what risk transference
and distribution opportunities insureds demand from insurers. Part II describes
the current array of regulations of health insurers' use of genetic information.
This part explores both federal and state regulation and gives special attention
to the recent statutory enactment in Missouri. Part III links the regulatory
fiamework described in Part II to the rationales for regulation developed in Part
I. It concludes that the current regulatory scheme is both tentative and
ambivalent. This conclusion casts doubt on whether, in a hypothetical
environment where genetic testing is widely available and widely used, the
regulatory objectives could be achieved without further changes in federal and
state law.
I. A NARRATIVE ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GENETIC INFORMATION
FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF RISK DISTRIBUTION POOLS
Fifty men and women, all strangers to each other, sit in a room. The
"leader" enters the room and distributes to each of the fifty a one-page sheet with
approximately one hundred letters and numbers printed on it.8 The meaning of
the pattern of seemingly random letters and numbers is not known to anyone in
the room.9 The leader explains that she, having secured the genetic code for
each person in the room, has just distributed it to its respective "owner." At this
moment, it is obvious that each person feels profoundly violated and insecure.
The violation comes from the leader's demonstration that she could access such
intimate and personal information. The insecurity comes from the shared
suspicion about what the leader is going to say next. The air is heavy with fear
that the leader will reveal disturbing information about their futures, information
that many prefer not to know. Indeed, some would rather not know even "good
information" about their genetic profiles, preferring instead to live in ignorance
of whatever the future holds.
8. The 100 letters and numbers are proxies for the roughly 100,000 genes in the
human genome. For more information on the nature of the human genome, see Green,
supra note 2, at 617.
9. If this exercise is performed in a classroom or other setting, the symbolism of
the random distribution of genetic profiles to individuals in the room should be

emphasized. Individuals cannot control the genes received at birth; genetic fortune and
misfortune are randomly distributed throughout society, just as the hypothetical genetic
profiles are distributed to those in the room.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/1
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The leader explains that all persons, including everyone in the room, have
between five and fifty significant genetic alterations. ° Some alterations are
irrelevant, and others are more serious." For about three percent of those in the
room, the weak links will be irrelevant; they will perish in an accident 2 before
the genetic defect becomes manifest. But for the other ninety-seven percent, the
leader explains that one of the weak genetic links eventually will manifest itself
and either cause or contribute to their death. The weak link may act by itself or,
as is more likely, in conjunction with other factors to produce death. If multiple
factors are involved, the genetic weakness is likely to define a range of
probabilities within which the individual's fate will be determined by other
considerations, including some that he or she can control. 3 With respect to most
genes, however, the leader concedes that science does not yet understand how
they function or interact with other elements in the environment to increase or
reduce morbidity and mortality. Even so, the leader observes that two of the
fifty genetic profiles just distributed convey very bad news: a certainty of early
death due to a prolonged, not-yet-manifested, inevitable illness.
At this juncture, the narrative could take one of two turns, each leading to
a very different conclusion. In the first scenario, the leader does not reveal who
possesses the fateful genetic information, and she observes that each person in
the room has the same chance of holding a fateful profile. This equal chance of
misfortune creates a shared interest among those in the room. In effect, the
randomness of the risk creates a special kind of community. Perhaps without the
leader's prompting, someone in the room will speak up and say, "Let's make an

agreement among ourselves. No matter who in the room has the unfortunate
prognosis, let's agree that each of us will contribute to the cost of taking care of
the end-of-life health care needs of that person." The proposal is to form a
mutual aid society-to establish a community consisting of all fifty persons in
the room. The advantage of membership in this community is the security
achieved by belonging to it; the risk of financial loss associated with the
probability of holding a poor genetic profile is transferred to the common, to-be-

10. See Monique K. Mansoura & Francis S. Collins, Medical Implicationsof the
Genetic Revolution, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. &POL'Y 329, 334 (1998) ("All of us carry an
estimated five to fifty significant genetic alterations.").
11. See also Katrina Allen & Robert Williamson, Should We Genetically Test
EveryoneforHaemochromatosis?,25 J. MED. ETHIcs 209, 212 (1999) ("[W]e all carry
a number of recessive genes that are not clinically important unless two persons with the
same recessive mutation have children.").
12. In 1997, approximately 3.57 percent of all deaths in the United States resulted
from accidents or the adverse effects of accidents. Table 26: Number of deaths,death
rates, and age-adjusted death rates for major causes of death for the United States,
1997, 47 NAT'L VITAL STATISTIcs REPs., June 30, 1999, at 82.
13. For a discussion of the predictive limitations of genetic information, see H.
Gilbert Welch & Wylie Burke, Uncertaintiesin Genetic Testingfor ChronicDisease,
280 J.A.M.A. 1525 (1998).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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created pool. Each person in the room substitutes a certain, small loss-the
commitment to absorb one-fiftieth of the cost of caring for the unfortunate
persons' health care costs-for the one in twenty-five chance of having to bear
one hundred percent of the cost of a life-terminating illness. Each person is
asked-and is willing-to pay this certain, small loss in exchange for being
freed from the risk of devastating economic misfortune. After all, suffering
personal misfortune would be difficult enough; finding a way to avoid
compounding the grief with economic devastation is imperative for everyone.
When the leader distributes the uninterpreted genetic information, quick
action is needed to form the mutual aid society. Once the manifestation of
illness or the interpretation of the genetic information makes it clear who has the
fateful genetic profiles, it will become much more difficult, perhaps impossible,
to strike the deal. This is the second scenario: Before the multilateral
commitments are made, the leader reveals the identities of those who are
destined to perish from the genetically ordained illness. Unless the fifty persons
in the room are altruists who take pleasure in assuming the expenses of others
(and altruists of varied fervor do exist in society), the possibility of forming a
mutual aid society fades when the implications of the genetic information are
understood. Those forty-eight persons in the room who learn that their genetic
profiles are sound will opt to allocate their resources to things other than
subsidizing the problem faced by the unfortunate. After all, these forty-eight
have learned that they have no risk; consequently, there is nothing to transfer to
a risk distribution mechanism. This does not mean that these persons are without
empathy for the unfortunate, but their statements to the unlucky ones are
predictable: "I feel sorry for you, and I have sympathy for your misfortune. But
I have three children at home, college educations ahead, elderly parents
confronting uncertain long-term care expenses, and a spouse to think of,not to
mention myself, and I regrettably must tell you that I cannot give you the same
priority that I give these other people and needs in my life." The reveldtion of
the meaning of the genetic information makes all the difference. If the identities
of those who are affected with bad genes remain unknown, the odds are much
higher that all fifty persons will enter into a multilateral arrangement to share the
expense, certain to occur but uncertain as to whom, of two persons' illnesses.
This exercise, as simple as it is, illustrates several aspects of the dynamics
of group formation in insurance markets. First, embedded in the actuarial
realities of insurance are communitarian values. When a group is faced with a
significant adverse risk that will attach randomly and unpredictably to one or
more individuals in the group, the group's members will tend to organize around
a shared understanding. Each person in the group will contribute, pursuant to
some agreed-upon formula, to a fund that will be used to compensate the
unfortunate, yet-to-be-determined member of the group for his or her impending
loss. This shared understanding is mutually beneficial. Each person knows that
he or she need not save for contingent catastrophes, each person can substitute
a smaller, predictable expense for the risk of catastrophic loss, and each person
can devote his or her other resources to productive activities, thereby generating
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/1
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more wealth for others in the community. The shared understanding also has
psychological value. Each person gets the benefits associated with the peace of
mind that comes with participating in an organization committed to the wellbeing of its individual members. 4
Second, while individuals desire the benefits of membership in
communities, not all individuals are welcomed into membership on equal terms.
Under the second scenario above, the forty-eight persons with solid genetic
profiles still face equal, random chances of misfortune, some of which is
nevertheless related to their genetic compositions. If they begin to think about
these risks, they might form a mutual aid society to disperse their remaining
risks, but they will not offer the two persons with the weak genetic profiles
membership in this more narrowly defined community. Stated otherwise, to the
extent that a person desiring membership is known to be "high risk" and
therefore more likely to draw upon the resources of the collective, he or she will
not be welcome into the membership on the same terms offered to other similarly
situated persons, and perhaps not at all. Thus, from the perspective of the fortyeight individuals with common characteristics, it is better if larger
communities-the group of fifty in this exercise-are subdivided into
differentiated risk pools: one for high-risk and one for low-risk individuals.
This segmentation enables those with lower risks to benefit economically by
paying lower premiums for the smaller risks they transfer to the pool. One hopes
that the two persons excluded from the community of forty-eight will find many
other similarly excluded persons and that these high-risk persons will organize
their own mutual aid society. Yet if the risk of loss is at or near one hundred
percent, the odds of being able to form a community on terms requiring less than
a premium equal to the loss are practically nonexistent.
Third, to the extent broader pools of insureds with more extensive risksharing among diverse populations based on principles of community rating"5 are
14. The industry promotes peace of mind in its marketing campaigns. Such
phrases as "like a good neighbor, State Farm is there," "you're in good hands with
Allstate," get a "piece of the rock" (Prudential), "Nationwide is on your side," etc.
appeal to the policyholder's desire for security, which underscores the psychological
value of insurance. For more discussion, see Tom Baker, Constructingthe Insurance
Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims Stories, and InsuranceContractDamages,72 TEX.
L. REv. 1395 (1994); Deborah A. Stone, Promises and Public Trust: Rethinking
InsuranceLaw Through Stories, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1435 (1994).

15. "Community rating" refers to a method of determining the price of health
insurance based on the anticipated utilization by the population as a whole, as opposed
to anticipated utilization by individuals or specific groups. Premiums, then, average out
across the entire community, without regard to whether any particular individual has, or
is likely to have (or does not have or is not likely to have) any particular health-related
trait or characteristic. Under community rating schemes, low-risk insureds subsidize
high-risk insureds. In contrast to community rating is "experience rating," where a

premium for health insurance is based on a group's past claims experience. Healthier
subgroups of a community pay less for insurance, and those who need more health care
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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desired, system designers must account for the preferences of insurance
consumers, which drive insurers to create smaller, more homogeneous
communities. That is, systems which are neither compulsory nor universal must
contend with the desire of individuals to organize in mutual aid communities
consisting of individuals with similar loss potential. This, in brief, is the
practical significance of the foregoing narrative. If members of a large
community know about the differences among the members and understand the
significance of these differences, and if altruism is not a shared cultural norm,
the low-risk members will ask to be segregated from the high-risk members.
Products will appear in the market, whether created by the low-risk persons
directly or created by others, that will fulfill this demand. The regulatory
mechanisms described in Part II can be understood as a social and political

response to the inevitable tendency toward market segmentation that arises when
information about risk becomes more widely disseminated and understood.
II. REGULATING HEALTH INSURERS' USE OF GENETIC INFORMATION
A. MissouriS.B. 722
In 1998, with relatively little fanfare, the Missouri legislature passed 16 and
the Governor signed into law Missouri S.B. 722"7 which, inter alia, restricts
Missouri health insurers' use of genetic information in underwriting practices.
These provisions comprise one part of a more extensive bill covering two other
insurance topics.' To the extent the genetic discrimination provisions received

(such as the elderly) pay more for health insurance.
16. There was little controversy about the legislation, Senate Bill 722. S.B. 722,
89th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Mo. 1998). S.B. 722 passed the Senate unanimously (32-0) and
passed the House 133-23. S.B. 722 was sponsored by Sen. Betty Sims, Id.; a similar but
broader House Bill, H.B. 1316, was sponsored by Rep. Patrick Dougherty. See H.B. 190,
90th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mo. 1999). The House Bill was reintroduced in the 1999 legislature
by Rep. Dougherty as H.B. 190, but was subsequently withdrawn. As proposed, H.B.
190 was more robust than S.B. 722 in that it proposed to make the violator "liable in a
civil action for damages and equitable relief' in addition to the $500 (or less) fine
mandated by S.B. 722. Id. H.B. 190 also defined "genetic information" so as to include
"inherited characteristic... information," which presumably referred to information
about family history and some data revealed by routine medical tests or exams. Id. S.B.
722 has a more limited reach. See infra text accompanying notes 23-26.
17. S.B. 722 is codified at Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 375.1300-.1309 (Supp. 1999). It

was signed into law by Governor Carnahan on July 10, 1998, and became effective on
January 1, 1999. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 375.1300-.1309 (Supp. 1999).
18. S.B. 722, Section 3 prohibits Missouri insurers from discriminating against
victims of domestic violence. This subject is one which has recently received attention
in many other state legislatures. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.430 (Michie 1997)

(insurer may not refuse to issue or renew coverage, etc. if the refusal, etc. is based strictly
on the fact that insured is a victim of domestic violence); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/1
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any attention, the debate closely tracked the debate in other jurisdictions in
which the merit of similar regulations has been considered.1 9

1. Scope
Most of the statute's scope-defining provisions are drafted narrowly; the
cumulative impact is to limit the statute's overall regulatory effect. Like most
other state laws regulating the use of genetic information in insurance, the
Missouri statute applies only to health insurance. Life insurance, disability
insurance, long-term care insurance, and reinsurance are specifically exempted."
This underscores the uniqueness of health insurance and the special status that

access to health care enjoys in the United States, at least relative to the
importance placed on the economic welfare of the survivors of decedents, on
replacing income when one cannot work due to illness or accident, and on the

affordability of housing and personal care services for the elderly. Although the

448 (West 1998); 1999 N.D. LAws 272. It has also been featured in the popular media.
See, e.g., Cover Domestic Victims, DENVER POST, May 28, 1998, at B1O; Andrea Glen,
States Adopt Measures to ProtectAbuse Victims from Insurers' Bias, WALL ST. J., Feb.
8, 1996, at Bll. The abuse status of applicants and policyholders is now the subject of
several NAIC model acts. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMISSIONERS,
MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES 895-1 (1999) (Unfair Discrimination
Against Subject of Abuse in Health Benefit Plans Model Act); Id. at 896-1 (Unfair
DiscriminationAgainst Subjects ofAbuse in Life InsuranceModel Act); Id. at 897-1
(UnfairDiscriminationAgainst Subjects ofAbuse in DisabilityIncome InsuranceModel
Act); Id. at 898-1 (Unfair DiscriminationAgainst Subjects of Abuse in Property and
CasualtyInsuranceModel Act).
The remaining Sections of S.B. 722 regulate the illustrations that insurers might use
to explain certain kinds of life insurance products. See S.B. 722 §§ 6-15 (codified at Mo.
REV. STAT. §§ 375.1500-.1530 (Supp. 1999)).
19. Supporters of the bill claimed that regulation was needed to prevent
discriminatory practices by health insurers. The director of cancer screening services at
Ellis Fischel Cancer Center in Columbia, Missouri said that all 50 women in the Center's
risk-assessment program had declined to take an available genetic test for fear that the
privacy of the test results could not be maintained. Data compiled by the Council for
Responsible Genetics, claiming that 200 cases of discrimination had existed through the
country, was presented. Some insurers opposed the bill on account of its alleged
ambiguity and potential effects on life insurance. Alliance Blue Cross/Blue Shield said
it does not require genetic tests and had no plans to start doing so. No evidence was
presented showing that any resident of Missouri suffered an adverse insurance result on
account of genetic testing. See Kim Bell, MissouriBill Would SeparateGenetic Testing,
Insurers'Action,ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 10, 1998, at Al (reporting on bill and
recent hearing before House Insurance Committee); see also Bill Bell Jr., Insurance
DiscriminationMeasure is Backed; Panel Oks Bill to Help Domestic Violence Victims,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, April 22, 1998, at B4; Bill Bell Jr., Senate Passes Bill to
Prevent Bias After Genetic Testing, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 9, 1998, at A20.
20. S.B. 722, § 2(3), 89th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Mo. 1998).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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statute's scope is confined to health insurance, "insurer" is defined broadly to
include any entity engaged in the business of insurance as well as health
maintenance organizations and "other similar health service plans."'"
"Genetic information" and "genetic test" are defined narrowly, thereby
further limiting the statute's reach. Section 1(3) defines "genetic information"
as "the results of a genetic test," but expressly excludes from this definition
information obtained from "family history, the results of routine physical
measurements, or the results of chemical, blood, urine analysis, or from results
of tests for drugs or the presence of human immunodeficiency virus, or the22
results of any other tests commonly accepted in clinical practice at the time.1
Further, "genetic test" is defined as "a laboratory test of human deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) or ribonucleic acid (RNA) used to identify the presence or absence
of inherited alterations in the DNA or RNA which cause predisposition to
disease or illness." This definition explicitly excludes information obtained from
"routine physical measurements and examinations, routine tests performed as a
part of a physical examination, chemical blood or urine analysis, cholesterol
tests, tests for the presence of the human immunodeficiency virus, a test for
drugs, or tests commonly accepted in clinical practice at the time." The upshot
of these definitions is that health insurers are authorized to conduct traditional
medical tests as part of the underwriting process, even if such tests reveal genetic
disorders or other kinds of information that would be revealed by a genetic test.
Similarly, if the insurer (or its agent) directly examines the applicant and detects
a genetic disorder by merely observing a physical symptom of that disorder, the
insurer can lawfully use the information in underwriting. Moreover, the insurer
is allowed to use the information with respect to not only the insured or
prospective applicant but also the relatives of that individual, which may be
important if the information concerns an inheritable genetic disorder.
The statute's narrow definitions of "genetic information" and "genetic test"
are ironic in that they forbid use of the "best evidence" of a genetic
condition-the results of a genetic test-but allow insurers to use "second-best
evidence," such as inquiries about family history and other non-genetic medical
tests which nevertheless discover genetic information. To the extent second-best
evidence is used as a proxy for the best evidence (i.e., to the extent second-best
evidence is used to make a distinction that could be made more accurately
through some other means), some persons will be disadvantaged. Yet if genetic
tests are too expensive relative to the gains in accuracy to be achieved by
administering them, no one should favor their use, because no one would benefit
economically from such testing. This appears to be the situation in Missouri and
21. Id. § 1(5).
22. Id. § 1(3). For the argument that DNA-based information is distinct from
information garnered from non-genetic tests and therefore should be regulated
differently, see Ronald M. Green & A. Mathew Thomas, DNA: Five Distinguishing
Featuresfor Policy Analysis, 11 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 571 (1998).
23. S.B. 722, § 1(4).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/1
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elsewhere, at least for the present. Essentially, the statute forbids a method of
inquiry into risk that no insurer in Missouri apparently now uses or desires to
use. At the same time, the statute authorizes insurers to use other types of
inquiry that can reveal, albeit less accurately, the same kind of information as
genetic tests, thereby producing similar trends toward genetic segregation. If a
more durable stand against genetic discrimination were desired, one would not
authorize the use of less exact proxies (such as family history) as a substitute for
the information that would have been garnered from genetic tests and would
instead prohibit insurers from using genetic information acquired from any
source, including family history, medical history, and routine physical tests.
In contrast to the provisions defining "genetic test" and "genetic
information" and confining the statute's reach to health insurance, the types of
insurer activities subject to the statute's reach are articulated broadly. The
underwriting practices that must comply with the statute's substantive provisions
include "determining eligibility for coverage, establishing premiums, limiting
coverage, renewing coverage or any other underwriting decision."24
Furthermore, these practices are to be scrutinized with respect to the "offer, sale,
or renewal of a health plan,"' which covers all ways in which a health plan is
marketed.
2. Prohibitions
The statute's substantive provisions identify four specific practices in which
insurers may not engage: (1) "requir[ing] or request[ing] a person or blood
relative of such person to provide genetic information or take a genetic test"; (2)
"inquir[ing] to determine whether a person or blood relative of such person has
taken or refused a genetic test or what the results of any such test were[,]" unless
approved by the applicant or insured; (3) "consider[ing] ... the fact that genetic
information or a genetic test was taken or refused by a person or blood relative
of such person[,]" unless approved by the applicant or insured; and (4)
"consider[ing] ... genetic information or the results of any genetic test taken by
a person or blood relative of such person[,]" unless approved by the applicant or

insured.26 Taken cumulatively, these provisions prohibit an insurer from
requiring an individual (or blood relative) to undergo a genetic test (or ask about

the results of any such test) as a condition to obtaining or renewing insurance
coverage. Furthermore, they prohibit an insurer from using, unless approved by
the applicant or insured, already existing genetic test results and genetic
information (or the fact of whether such a test was ever taken or refused) about
an applicant, insured, or any of his or her blood relatives to deny or cancel, or to
increase the premiums for, such coverage. If the insurer violates this section, it

24. Id. § 2.
25. S.B. 722, § 2, 89th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Mo. 1998).

26. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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commits an "unfair27trade practice" within the meaning of the Missouri Unfair
Trade Practice Act.
Because the statute prohibits insurers from inquiring about genetic tests or
genetic test results or otherwise requesting that a test be taken, the question
arises as to how an insured's or applicant's approval to use existing genetic
information can ever be obtained. By the statute's plain terms, the approval
cannot be requested by an insurer or otherwise obtained at the insurer's behest.
But if an insured voluntarily discloses or announces a willingness to disclose the
results of genetic tests, including those tests taken by blood relatives, the insurer
can accept the information without contravening the statute's prohibitions. Thus,
an insured or applicant can offer results of genetic tests in order to clarify what
might otherwise appear to be a problematic symptom or trait for underwriting
purposes. The critical point is that the insurer can accept information offered to
it, but the insurer must be careful not to request it.
Missouri is not the only state that allows insureds to volunteer the results
of genetic tests and other genetic information.28 Obviously, in these states, no
insured will freely submit adverse information to an insurer. Consequently,
insurers will receive permission to use information only when it is favorable to
the insured or the applicant. Under the Missouri statute, nothing prohibits an
insurer from giving favorable treatment, in terms of coverage or price, to a
person who volunteers good genetic information. As a result, insurers might
offer premium reductions to someone who submits a test showing a good genetic
profile. In a hypothetical market in which many genetic tests have been given
and most persons are able to produce the favorable results of their tests, one
should expect a large number of insureds to voluntarily convey their good
information in order to secure premium reductions, leaving those with either no
tests or poor results to pay higher premiums.
This phenomenon is appropriately labeled proverse selection, which can be
understood as a corollary to adverse selection. Adverse selection refers to the
tendency in any risk classification for a higher proportion of riskier insureds to
self-select into the pool, given that more high-risk insureds will perceive any
given classification as a better bargain than lower-risk insureds who fall within
the parameters of the classification.29 In contrast, proverse selection refers to the
tendency of low-risk insureds to depopulate risk pools when given an
opportunity to opt into classifications that offer more coverage or a reduced

27. Id. § 2(1) (incorporating the provisions of MO. REV. STAT. §§ 375.930 -.948
(1998)).
28. See, e.g., 410 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 513/20 (West 1997) (insurer may
consider results of genetic test if voluntarily submitted by insured and results are
favorable); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-26-9 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1999); Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1999, 1999 MD. LAWS ch. 50
(disclosure of genetic information allowed only upon consent from the individual tested).
29. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 10[c], at 16 (2d
ed. 1996).
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premium, or both. When a process of proverse selection has run its course, a
disproportionate number of high-risk insureds will remain in the former
classification, which will prompt an increase in the premiums charged in order
to cover the higher losses. The Missouri statute, by authorizing insureds to
voluntarily submit genetic information in order to acquire a preferred rate, leaves
open the possibility that, notwithstanding the statutory prohibitions, those with
adverse genetic information might be charged more for insurance or receive less
coverage than those without problematic genetic profiles. This, of course, is
precisely the situation the legislature sought to foreclose through the enactment
of S.B. 722. For the present, this unintended outcome is unlikely because
genetic testing is not widespread. If, however, genetic testing becomes less
expensive and more prevalent, as many observers expect, 30 the market
segmentation which S.B. 722 seeks to foreclose could develop through the
process of proverse selection.
3. Other Provisions
Two other aspects of the Missouri statute's genetic information provisions
deserve mention. First, a separate section of the statute applies to employers.
This section states that "[a]n employer shall not use any genetic information or
genetic test results [as defined in the provisions discussed above] ...

of an

employee or prospective employee to distinguish between, discriminate against,
or restrict any right or benefit otherwise due or available to such employee or
prospective employee., 31 By its terms, this prohibition applies to self-funded

30. See Genetic Tests Remain Unregulatedand Inaccurate,6 AM. POL. NETWORKAM. HEALTH LINE 14 (quoting Francis Collins, Director of the U.S. National Human
Genome Research Institute at the NIH, who observes that of the 600 genetic tests already
available, "[the] majority are now for very rare diseases in families plagued by certain
illnesses," but "more routine testing of now-healthy people to predict their future risks
of cancer or other killers is poised to explode"); Braun, supra note 7 (observing that

although genetic tests will remain expensive for the "near future," "silicon chip-based
tests for multiple genetic mutations will be available early in the next century"); Steve
Connor, Firms' Genetic Tests on StaffShould be Illegal,Say Experts, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), July 15, 1999, at 10 (reporting study by UK Human Genetics Advisory
Commission finding only one employer using genetic tests now, but observing that the

practice could become more widespread as the tests become less expensive).
31. S.B. 722, § 4(1), 89th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Mo. 1998). This Section enumerates
four safe harbors for the employer. The prohibition does not apply to (1)underwriting
in connection with individual or group life, disability, or long-term care insurance; (2)
"[a]ny action required or permissible by law or regulation"; (3) "[a]ction taken with the

written permission of an employee or prospective employee or such person's authorized
representation"; (4) "[t]he use of genetic information when such information is directly
related to a person's ability to perform assigned job responsibilities." Id. An employer
can be fined for violating the provision, but the fine is small-$500 for each violation.

Id. § 4(2). For a concise discussion of the employer provisions, see Armstrong, Teasdale,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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health insurance plans. In other contexts an employer operating a self-funded
plan can disregard a state regulatory statute because state regulation of selffunded plans is preempted by ERISA.32 In this context, however, state law is in
accord with federal prohibitions which, as discussed below, apply to self-funded
plans and prohibit the use of genetic information in the underwriting of selffunded plans.33
Second, a separate section of the statute pertains to confidentiality of
genetic information. In essence, any person who handles genetic information in
the course of business, the practice of a profession, or the rendering of a service
"shall hold such information as confidential medical records and shall not
disclose such genetic information" without the written authorization of the

person (or his or her authorized representative) to which such information
pertains. 34 The confidentiality provision applies to any health insurer that
happens to acquire access to genetic information. It also applies to any other
insurance entity, such as a life, disability, or long-term care insurer, that acquires
such information.
B. The MissouriStatute in a Broader Context
The Missouri statute is only one aspect of a much broader regulatory
framework. First, federal law places some limits on the use of genetic
information by insurers and group health plans.35 Second, thirty-four other states
have enacted statutes limiting health insurers' use of genetic information.36
Although these statutes vary in their scope and effect,37 most of them regulate
insurers' use of genetic information with respect to both group and individual

Schafly & Davis, Missouri Law to ProhibitGenetic Discriminationin the Workplace, 8
Mo. EMP. L. LETrER 1 (1998).
32. The Employee Income Retirement Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 10011461 (1994) (hereinafter ERISA), is a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme for
employee benefit plans. As interpreted, ERISA prevents states from regulating selffunded health insurance plans provided to employees as fringe benefits. See, e.g.,
American Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1997).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 41-63.
34. S.B. 722, § 5(1), 89th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Mo. 1998). This Section has four safe
harbors. The prohibition does not apply to (1) anonymous statistical data; (2) data
associated with certain kinds of health research; (3)"release of such information pursuant
to legal or regulatory process"; or (4) "release of such information for body
identification." Id. A person can be fined for violating the provision, but the fine is only
$500. Id. § 5(2).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 41-84.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 85-103.
37. For a recent discussion of some of these differences, see Helen R. Davis &
Janice V. Mitrius, Note, Recent Legislationon Genetics andInsurance,37 JURIMETRICS
J. 69 (1996); Meredith A. Jagutis, Comment, Insurer'sAccess to Genetic Information:
The Callfor ComprehensivePederalLegislation,82 MARQ. L. REv. 429 (1999).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/1
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plans, and some have freestanding privacy provisions. By virtue of ERISA
preemption,3 8 these statutes do not reach (or, at least, should be understood not
to reach3 9) self-funded plans. Consequently, federal law provides the outer
bounds of regulation on insurers' use of genetic information for self-funded
plans.
1. Federal Regulation: HIPAA
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
("HIPAA")40 regulates the use of genetic information in health insurance in two
ways. Because HIPAA does not regulate individual insurance plans, neither set
of restrictions extends to the underwriting process for individual insurance plans.
a. Preexisting Conditions and Genetic Information
HIPAA's first restriction on insurers' use of genetic information is related
to HIPAA's goal of increasing the portability of group health insurance plans by
limiting the effectiveness of preexisting condition exclusions. In essence, this
restriction provides that genetic information cannot, in and of itself, constitute
a preexisting condition, which means that a covered employee cannot face a
denial of coverage based on genetic information alone. Although the principle
is easily stated, the statutory structure that produces this outcome is complicated.
HIPAA's portability requirements extend to two categories of entities.
First, they extend to any "group health plan," which is defined as "an employee
welfare benefit plan to the extent that the plan provides medical care... to
employees or their dependents... directly or through insurance, reimbursement,
or otherwise.""1 Thus, this part of HIPAA extends to ERISA-type plans,

38. See supra note 33.

39. A few state statutes regulating genetic information purport to reach self-funded
plans. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-53-1(3) (Supp. 1999) (defining "health benefit plan"
subject to statute as, inter alia, "self-insured health plan"); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
627.4301(2) (Supp. 1999) (defining "health insurer" to include self-insured plan).
Compare GA. STAT. ANN. § 33-54-2(2) (Michie 1996) (defining "insurer" to include,
inter alia, self-insured plans not subject to exclusive jurisdiction of ERISA). Whatever
the intentions of the legislatures in these states, if such regulation occurred and if it were
subsequently challenged, existing judicial interpretations of ERISA's preemptive reach
would, if consistently applied, invalidate the regulation.
40. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of

29 &42 U.S.C.).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1191b(a)(1) (1994). In the corollary provisions in the Internal
Revenue Code, "group health plan" is defined by reference to 26 U.S.C. § 5000(b)(1)
(1994), which defines the term as "a plan (including a self-insured plan) of, or
contributed to by, an employer (including a self-employed person) or employee
organization to provide health care (directly or otherwise) to the employee, former
employees, the employer, others associated or formerly associated with the employer in
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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including self-funded plans. Second, the portability requirements extend to
"health insurance issuer[s] offering group health insurance coverage." 2 A
"health insurance issuer" is defined as "an insurance company, insurance service,
or insurance organization (including a health maintenance organization...)
which is licensed to engage in the business of insurance in a State and which is
subject to State law which regulates insurance (within the meaning of section
514(b)(2)."4' 3 Thus, with respect to both health plans and health insurers, HIPAA
restricts the use of preexisting condition exclusions.
HIPAA broadly defines "preexisting condition exclusion" as "a limitation
or exclusion of benefits relating to a condition based on the fact that the
condition was present before the date of enrollment for such coverage, whether
or not any medical advice, diagnosis, care, or treatment was recommended or
received before such date."4 With respect to this definition, HIPAA states
further that "[g]enetic information shall not be treated as a condition described
in (a)(1) of this section in the absence of a diagnosis of the condition related to
such information."45 Under Section (a)(1), plans and insurers can impose a
preexisting condition exclusion only if it meets the requirements of that
Section.' Thus, genetic information, in and of itself, cannot constitute a
preexisting condition, and a covered employee cannot be denied coverage on
that account. If, however, a physician diagnoses the individual as having a
health condition that is related to the person's genetic profile, the condition could
be the subject of a valid preexisting condition exclusion, assuming the other
requirements of Section (a)(1) are met.
There is room to argue about the scope of the "physician diagnosis"
exception. The statutory language plainly contemplates that a diagnosis of a
symptomatic illness related to genetic information can be a preexisting condition.
But it is unclear whether a diagnosis of a predisposition to a health condition
related to the genetic information in circumstances where the person is
asymptomatic at the time of the diagnosis falls within the exception. 47 If it is
agreed that genetic information unaccompanied by any medical interpretation of
the information is not a "condition" and therefore cannot possibly be a

a business relationship, or their families."
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1181(a) (Supp. 1111997).
44. 26 U.S.C. § 9832(b)(2) (Supp. III 1997); 29 U.S.C. § 1191(b)(2) (Supp. III
1997).
44. 26 U.S.C. § 9801(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 11 1997); 29 U.S.C. § 1181(b)(1)(A) (Supp.
III 1997).
45. 26 U.S.C. § 9801(b)(1)(B) (Supp. m 1997); 29 U.S.C. § 1181(b)(1)(B) (Supp.
III 1997).
46. See 26 U.S.C. § 9801(a)(1) (Supp. III 1997); 29 U.S.C. § 1181(a)(1) (Supp. III
1997).
47. See Alexandra K. Glazier, Genetic Predispositions,ProphylacticTreatments
and PrivateHealth Insurance: Nothing is Better than a GoodPairof Genes, 23 AM. J.
L. & MED. 45, 65-66 (1997).
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"diagnosis of a condition," Congress must have meant that a diagnosis, based on
genetic information, that a person is susceptible to developing symptoms (i.e.,
a condition) sometime in the future should not be understood to fall within the
preexisting condition exclusion. In other words, to be a condition for which
coverage might be excluded under the preexisting condition exclusion, the
condition related
to the genetic information must be manifest or, at a minimum,
48
symptomatic.
b. Defining "Genetic Information"
The term "genetic information," as used in the above-quoted sections (and
elsewhere in HIPAA), is not statutorily defined. At a minimum, the term must
be understood to include the results of DNA, RNA, and related gene testing.
Family medical history would seem to fit squarely within the ambit of "genetic
information"; indeed, the reason insurers have long asked family medical history
questions on applications for personal insurance is because of what is known
about inheritable characteristics and the implications of such information for the
mortality and morbidity of applicants and insureds. This commonsense
understanding of "genetic information" is, however, undercut by the text and
structure of the statute. In the separate antidiscrimination provisions of
HIPAA, 49 "genetic information" is listed as one item in a series and as one
alternative to "medical history," as well as other factors.5 0 If "genetic
information" subsumes "medical history," one would expect the
antidiscrimination provision to have read "genetic information (including
medical history)," but this is not how Congress structured the statute. Congress
was aware of the role a parenthetical construction might play in the itemized list
of health factors because this construction was used in the item "evidence of

insurability (including conditions arising out of acts of domestic violence)."'"
48. For the argument that diagnosis of a genetic predisposition is a preexisting
condition and that subsequent treatment for that condition may be excluded from
coverage, see Glazier, supra note 48, at 64-66.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 60-63.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1182 (1994) lists "genetic information" as a health factor, along
with "health status," "medical condition (including both physical and mental illnesses),"
"claims experience," "receipt of health care," "medical history," "evidence of insurability
(including conditions arising out of acts of domestic violence)," and "disability."
51. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-l(a)(1)(G) (Supp. 1111997). Text and its organization are,
of course, highly relevant to discerning congressional intent. See, e.g., Jones v. United
States, 119 S. Ct. 2090, 2102 (1999) ("Statutory language must be read in context and
a phrase 'gathers meaning from the words around it."') (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 367 U.S. 303,307 (1961)); Holloway v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 966,969 (1999)
(stating that "the language of the statutes that Congress enacts provides 'the most reliable
evidence of its intent"') (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981));
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 207, 218 (1984) (stating that it
is a "familiar principle of statutory construction that words grouped in a list should be
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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Because Congress did not use the phrase "genetic information (including
medical history)," the logical conclusion to draw is that "genetic information,"
as that term appears in HIPAA's portability regulation provisions, should be
given a reading that does not include medical history,52 notwithstanding the irony
that such a conclusion entails. 3
To defend a reading of "genetic information" that extends to family medical
history and personal medical history, including the results of routine laboratory
tests, one must reason that the use of the phrase in the antidiscrimination sections
is irrelevant to the portability regulation provisions.54 Without acknowledging
the nuances of the statutory text, the Pension and Welfare Benefits
Administration of the Department of Labor in its 1997 regulations implementing
HIPAA gave the term "genetic information" an expansive reading: "Genetic
information means information about genes, gene products, and inherited
characteristics that may derive from the individual or a family member. This
includes information regarding carrier status and information derived from
laboratory tests that identify mutations in specific genes or chromosomes,
physical medical examinations, family histories, and direct analysis of genes or
'
chromosomes."55
These regulations have not been subjected to judicial review.

given related meaning").
52. Note that for purposes of the antidiscrimination provisions, the separate
itemization of "genetic information" and "medical history" has no significance, because
all items on the list are proscribed. For more discussion, see infra text accompanying
notes 60-63.
53. See supra text following note 24; see also Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist.
v. Garret F., 119 S. Ct. 992, 997 (1999) ("The phrase 'medical science' in [Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act] does not embrace all forms of care that might loosely
be described as 'medical' in other contexts .. ").
54. The standard to be used to assess whether the agency has departed from the
statutory text has been described by the Supreme Court on numerous occasions. See,
e.g., United States v. HaggarApparel Co., 119 S.Ct. 1392 (1999); National Credit Union
Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998). In HaggarApparel, the
Court explained:
In the process of considering a regulation in relation to specific factual
situations, a court may conclude the regulation is inconsistent with the
statutory language or is an unreasonable implementation of it. In those
instances, the regulation will not control. Under Chevron [U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)], if a court determines that
'Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,' then 'that is
the end ofthe matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.' If, however, the agency's
statutory interpretation 'fills a gap or defines a term in a way that is
reasonable in light of the legislature's revealed design, we give [that]
judgment 'controlling weight."'
119 S.Ct. at 1399 (quoting Nations bank, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513
U.S. 251, 257 (1995)) (second alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
55. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.701-2 (1999).
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As of late 1999, legislation was pending in Congress that, if enacted, would
supersede the PWBA interpretation. 6 Under the proposed legislation, a
distinction is drawn between "genetic information," which includes not only
information about genes but also "inherited characteristics that may derive from
an individual or family member," and "predictive genetic information," which
includes genetic test information and "information about the occurrence of a
disease or disorder in family members" but not information acquired from
medical tests, physical exams, or information about a person's sex or age.5 7 In
the proposed legislation, insurers are prohibited from premium discrimination
based on "predictive genetic information," which has the effect of allowing
insurers to consider some genetic information, i.e., that obtained through
"physical" medical tests and exams.
If one gives a broad interpretation to the term "genetic information," such
as that provided by the PWBA, then the regulatory sweep of HIPAA becomes
much wider than that of the Missouri statute. In that event, the narrower
definition in the Missouri siatute is irrelevant for plans within the reach of
HIPAA. If, however, "genetic information" is given a narrower reading, the
possibility exists that a state might define "genetic information" more broadly
and thereby impose more aggressive regulation on the use of the information.
Because the Missouri definition of "genetic information" is already quite
narrow, 58 it is doubtful, given the pending federal legislative proposals, that this
latter circumstance will arise, at least in Missouri.

c. HIPAA's Antidiscrimination Provisions and Genetic Testing
The second way in which HIPAA regulates health insurers' use of genetic
information arises out of the statute's antidiscrimination provisions. This part
of FIPAA prohibits group health plans and health insurance issuers 59 from using
genetic information, medical history, or other specified health factors to
discriminate against individual participants and beneficiaries (i.e., either

56. See infra notes 84-89.
58. See S.B. 1344, § 301(c), 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999). In the proposed
statutory text, the medical tests are described as "physical tests, such as the chemical,
blood, or urine analyses of the individual including cholesterol tests." Id. Under this
proposed statutory language, an insurer could not use information from a urine test that
revealed a kidney disorder, but the insurer could use the insured's answers that he or she
had been treated in the past for a kidney disorder, assuming the information was used in
connection with the premium charged all members of the group and not just the
individual with the disorder.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1) (Supp. III 1997) applies to group health plans and to
health insurance issuers offering group health insurance coverage in connection with a
group health plan. The corollary provision, 26 U.S.C. § 9802 (Supp. III 1997), applies
only to group health plans.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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employees or their dependents).' In other words, plans cannot adopt eligibility
criteria or enrollment rules that discriminate against individuals based on any of
the enumerated factors. 61 BIPAA also prohibits plans from charging an
individual a premium that exceeds the premium charged to other similarly
situated individuals in the group based on genetic information or any of the other
enumerated health factors.62
d. What HIPAA Does Not Do
By HIPAA's express terms, the antidiscrimination provisions do not require
plans to provide particular benefits or to restrict the "amount, level, extent, or
nature of the benefits or coverage for similarly situated individuals enrolled in
the plan or coverage."'63 Thus, plans and health insurers are free to determine
what coverage they wish to offer and what premiums they wish to charge,
subject to state insurance laws that may regulate coverage and premiums, at least
to the extent the plans are not self-funded. 64 This means that a plan may decide
to exclude coverage for a particular medical condition, but it must apply the
exclusion to all enrollees on a nondiscriminatory basis. In other words, the plan
could not refuse to enroll (or fail to renew) a particular individual with the
medical condition when its policies provide coverage for that condition. Thus,
if a group contains one or more persons with a known or suspected genetic
disorder, the insurer could, without running afoul of HIPAA, raise the premium
for that group (subject only to the proscriptions of a particular state's regulations)
as long as everyone in the group is required to pay an identical, higher premium.
HIPAA does not regulate individual policies of health insurance.65 Insurers
remain free, subject to whatever state regulations might exist, to utilize genetic
information in determining eligibility to enroll, continued eligibility, price, and
coverage for individual policies of health insurance. Because most health
insurance is obtained through employer-created groups, 6 6 this regulatory gap is

60. For a list of the specified health factors, see supranote 51.
61. 26 U.S.C. § 9802(a)(1) (Supp. III 1997); 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1) (Supp. III
1997).
63.26 U.S.C. § 9802(b) (Supp. III 1997); 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b) (Supp. III 1997).
64. 26 U.S.C. § 9802(a)(2) (Supp. III 1997); 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (Supp. III
1997).
65. In that event, the plan is free from state regulation by virtue of ERISA
preemption. See supranote 33.
65. 26 U.S.C. § 9831(a)(2) (Supp. III 1997); 29 U.S.C. § 1191(a)(1) (Supp. III
1997).
66. In 1996, 71.1% of the U.S. population under age 65 had private health
insurance, and 91% of these persons obtained their insurance through a present or former
employer or labor union. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 1998, at 361, tbl. 133 (1998).
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not huge, but it is significant: Approximately 23.5 million Americans obtain
their health insurance through individual plans. 7
HIPAA does not regulate genetic privacy. Thus, it does not prohibit
insurers from requiring applicants to undergo genetic testing or to disclose the
results of past tests. Nor does it affect the extent to which genetic information
might be transmitted to insurers from third parties holding that information and
then used by insurers for purposes not affected by the Act, such as setting rates
or limiting coverage for an entire group. Because HIPAA does not prohibit

insurers from requiring or requesting individuals to undergo genetic tests or to
provide the results of any such tests, the insured carries the burden of
establishing that an insurer used information against a member of a group in
violation of HIPAA's antidiscrimination provisions.
HIPAA does address the issue of genetic privacy in one respect. It requires
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to study the privacy issues relating
to electronically transmittable individually identifiable health information and
make recommendations to Congress.' These recommendations were forwarded
to Congress on September 11, 1997.69 HIPAA contemplated that Congress
would enact privacy legislation; but if Congress failed to enact such legislation
by August 21, 1999-a self-imposed deadline Congress failed to meet 7 0-the
Secretary of HHS is required to promulgate final regulations on such standards
by February 21, 2000.1 This, of course, does not prevent Congress from
enacting superseding legislation before or after the Secretary acts. One way or
another, however, federal confidentiality standards for individually identifiable
medical information will be in place by February 21, 2000, unless Congress
repeals its own deadline.

67. This accounts for roughly 10% of insured Americans. Id.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2, 1320d-3 (Supp. 1111997) (requiring Secretary to make
recommendations no later than 18 months after August 21, 1996). For more discussion,
see Bartley L. Barefoot, Comment, Enactinga Health InformationConfidentiality Law:
Can CongressBeat the Deadline?,77 N.C. L. REV. 283 (1998).
69. See Secretary of Health and Human Services, ConfidentialityofIndividually(visited
Oct.
28,
1998)
Identifiable
Health
Information
<http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/admnsimp/pvrecO.htm>.
70. See Meg Fletcher, DeadlineMissed on PrivacyRules: CongressMay Still Act
Before HHS Issues Rules, Bus. INS., Aug. 16, 1999, at 56 (discussing Congress's failure
to meet August 21, 1999 deadline and its implications).
71. Section 264 of Public Law 104-191 provided that "[i]f legislation governing
standards with respect to the privacy of individually identifiable health information...
is not enacted by the date that is 36 months after the date of the enactment of this Act
[August 21, 1996], the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall promulgate final
regulations containing such standards not later than the date that is 42 months after the
date of the enactment of this Act." Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 2033-34 (1996). On
November 1, 1999, President Clinton and Health & Human Services Secretary Shalala
announced proposed regulations on the privacy of medical information. See The White
House, M2 PREssWiRE, Nov. 1, 1999, availablein 1999 WL 24365493.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

21

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 1

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 64

2. Federal Regulation: The ADA
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")72 is pertinent to genetic
screening in the context of employment-based health insurance, even if much is
unclear about this relationship. Title I of the ADA prohibits disability
discrimination in the "terms, conditions, and privileges" of employment,73 and
the EEOC has interpreted this language as extending to employer-provided
fringe benefits, which necessarily includes health insurance. 74 In March 1995,
the EEOC issued a compliance manual that took the position that individuals
who experience discrimination due to their genetic profiles are protected under
the ADA:
This part [the third part] of the definition of disability [referencing
individuals who are regarded as having impairments that substantially
limit one or more major life activities] applies to individuals who are
subjected to discrimination on the basis of genetic information relating
to illness, disease, or other disorders. Covered entities that
discriminate against individuals on the basis of such genetic
information are regarding the individuals as having impairments that
substantially limit a major life activity.75
The manual offered the following example:
CP's genetic profile reveals an increased susceptibility to colon
cancer. CP is currently asymptomatic and may never in fact develop
colon cancer. After making CP a conditional offer of employment, R
learns about CP's increased susceptibility to colon cancer. R then
withdraws the job offer because of concerns about matters such as
CP's productivity, insurance costs, and attendance. R is treating CP
as having an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.
Accordingly, CP is covered by the third part of the definition of
7' 6
"disability.
The EEOC's position-that the ADA protects persons with asymptomatic
genetic conditions from workplace discrimination-deserves deference as an
agency effort to interpret the statute it is required to administer, but the agency
guidance in the manual is necessarily less authoritative than a statute. Moreover,

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

42 U.S.C. § 12101-13 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(f) (1999).
EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL 902.8 (1995).

Id.
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commentators disagree on whether the EEOC's interpretation is correct, and the
EEOC's interpretation of "disability" has not been subjected to judicial review.'
Even if the EEOC's interpretation of "disability" is correct with respect to
asymptomatic genetic predispositions, exactly where the interpretation leads is
uncertain because the ADA also permits insurers and employers (whether the
plan is self-funded or issued by an insurer) to engage in traditional risk
classification and underwriting as long as there is no "subterfuge" of the
purposes of the ADA.78 The correct meaning of "subterfuge" in this context has

been much debated,79 but a fair reading of the ADA is that Congress intended
that "plans remain free to consider how various disabilities influence a person's
risk of death or illness. This exclusion permits risk-bearing health plans.., to
consider the anticipated cost of treating various disabilities."80 Thus, it would
seem that the ADA, although having considerable importance when genetic
information is used for non-underwriting purposes, was not intended to prevent
insurers and health plans from making coverage distinctions based on genetic
information if such distinctions have cost-based, actuarial justifications. Yet if
a particular coverage provision or exclusion that adversely affects a person with
a particular genetic profile is viewed as a "subterfuge" to discriminate against
that person (e.g., to make the job unattractive for disabled workers), the ADA
would appear to foreclose use of the genetic information by the insurer or health
plan. Absent further guidance from the regulators or Congress, this issue must
await clarification by the courts.8 1

3. Proposed Extensions of Federal Regulation
As of 1999, various proposals were pending in Congress that, if enacted,
would regulate insurers' use of genetic information in the individual health

77. See Paul Steven Miller, Genetic Discriminationin the Workplace, 26 J. L.
MED. &ETHICS 189, 191 (1998) (discussing Title I of the ADA, the EEOC interpretation,
and the attendant controversy). For additional discussion, see William M. Tarnow,
Genetic and Mental Disorders Under the ADA, 2 DEPAuL J. HEALTH CARE L. 291
(1998). The EEOC's interpretation of "disability" has not yet been subjected to judicial
review.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994).
79. See John V. Jacobi, The Ends ofHealth Insurance,30 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 311,
354 (1997).
80. Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health CareRationing andDisabilityRights, 70 IND. L.J.
491,511 (1995).
81. For more discussion of the intersection between the ADA and health insurance
generally, see John K. DiMugno, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct and Insurance,
INSURANCE LITIGATION REPORTER, Aug. 15, 1998, at 641; Jacobi, supra note 80, at 34566; Chrys A. Martin & Linda M. Bolduan, The Impact ofthe ADA on Life,Health, and
DisabilityInsurance,27 THE BRIEF, Summer 1998, at 14.
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insurance market and in Medigap plans,82 and employers' use of such
information in self-funded plans. Moreover, some of these proposals would
restrict the adjustment of rates on the basis of genetic information, including
prohibiting the adjustment of rates of entire groups based on a group member's
genetic information. 3

82. The term "Medigap" insurance refers to supplemental health insurance plans
sold to the elderly by private carriers. These policies are intended to fill coverage gaps
in the Medicare program. For more discussion of these plans and the federal regulations
to which they are subject, see Peter Fox et al., Medigap Regulation: Lessonsfor Health
CareReform, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 31 (1995).
83. As of September 1999, over twenty bills were pending in the 106th Congress
which would affect the use of or access to genetic information by health insurers. On
July 15, 1999, the Senate passed S. 1344 (the "Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act"), which
contained among its titles a proposed "Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health
Insurance Act of 1999." S.1344, 106th Cong. (1999). This legislation would prohibit
a group health plan from adjusting "premiums or contribution amounts for a group on the
basis of predictive genetic information concerning any individual (including a dependent)
or family member of the individual (including information about a request for or receipt
of genetic services)." See Comm. Print, § 302(a) (July 15, 1999). In addition, plans
would be prohibited from requesting or requiring such "predictive genetic information."
Id. A proposed exception from this prohibition, as drafted, read as follows:
[A] plan that provides health care items and services to an individual or
dependent may request (but may not require) that such individual or
dependent disclose, or authorize the collection or disclosure of, predictive
genetic information for purposes of diagnosis, treatment, or payment relating
to the provision of health care items and services to such individual or
dependent.
Id. § 302(b). S. 1344 would also amend the provisions of HIPAA to include definitions
of "genetic information" and "predictive genetic information." Id. § 302(a). In the bill,
"genetic information" is defined as "information about genes, gene products, or inherited
characteristics that may derive from an individual or a family member (including
information about a request for a receipt of genetic services)." Id. § 302(c). "Predictive
genetic information" is defined as:
[I]n the absence of symptoms, clinical signs, or a diagnosis of the condition
related to such information--(i) information about an individual's genetic
tests; (ii) information about genetic tests of family members of the individual;
or (iii) information about the occurrence of a disease or disorder in family
members.
Id. This text reaches more information than early drafts of the bill, which qualified the
foregoing definition to limit its reach to information "associated with a statistically
significant increased risk of a disease or disorder in the individual." See S.326, 106th
Cong. (1999). Specifically excepted from the definition of "predictive genetic
information" are information about the individual's age or sex, information "derived from
physical tests, such as the chemical, blood, or urine analyses of the individual, including
cholesterol tests; and information about physical exams of the individual." Comm. Print,
§ 302(c) (July 15, 1999).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/1
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4. State Regulation
The first state statutes regulating insurers' use of genetic information were
enacted in the 1970s." These statutes tended to focus on specific genetically
related conditions, such as sickle-cell, hemoglobin C, and Tay-Sachs traits, and
prohibited insurers from basing premium or coverage determinations on them.85
In the 1990s, state statutes went beyond specific conditions to broader regulation
of insurer practices with respect to genetic testing and underwriting on the basis
of such tests. Frequently, these statutes were combined with some measure of
privacy protection for the individual applicant and his or her family.8 6
By the end of the 1999 legislative sessions, thirty-five states had enacted
statutes regulating the use of genetic information by insurance companies.87 The

84. See Karen H. Rothenberg, Genetic Information and Health Insurance: State
Legislative Approaches, 23 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 312, 313 (1995).
85. Id.
86. The enactment of a statute in Wisconsin in 1991 arguably marks the beginning
of the era of broader state regulation. Id. at 313 (referring to WIS. STAT. ANN. § 631.89
(Supp. 1999)).
87. The statutes of 32 of these states are summarized in State Positionson the Issue
ofGenetic Testingfor InsuranceCoverage, in 1NAIC COMPENDIUM OF STATE LAWS ON
INSURANCE TOPICS, HE-43-1 through HE-43-7 (1999). For a collection, current as of
1996, of relevant excerpts of many of these statutes, see Report of the NAIC Genetic
Testing Working Group, 15 J. INS. REG. 7, 21-63 app. (1996). For another detailed
compilation of state statutes, see William F. Mulholland & Ami S. Jaeger, Genetic
Privacy and Discrimination: A Survey of State Legislation, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 317
(1999). Three states-Kansas, Nebraska, and North Dakota--enacted statutes after
January 1, 1999, and for that reason are not yet included in the NAIC compendium. See
Act of Mar. 19, 1999, 1999 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 15 (amending KAN. STAT. ANN. § 402209 (Supp. 1998)) (in group sickness and accident insurance, "genetic information shall
not be treated as a preexisting condition in the absence of a diagnosis of the condition
related to such information," and insurer may not condition eligibility based on genetic
information); Act of Feb. 24, 1999, 1999 Neb. Laws L.B. 259 (any entity which issues
a health insurance contract subject to state regulation through a "network plan" may
decline to cover certain described persons, but only if coverage is terminated without
regard to, inter alia, genetic information); Act of Apr. 1, 1999, 1999 N.D. Laws ch. 232
(to be codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 21-01.3-01 to -09) (defining "genetic information"
as "protected health information" which "is created or received by a... health plan..
. health or life insurer"; and limiting the extent to which public health authority may
disclose information, and the extent to which those who possess genetic information may
disclose the information to public health and law enforcement authorities). Two
additional states had activity in 1999 relating to prior statutory enactments. New Mexico
enacted a technical amendment of its prior statute, which had become effective in 1998.
See Act of Mar. 19, 1999, 1999 N.M. Laws ch. 82 (amending N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-217 (Michie Supp. 1998)) (stating that proceedings brought alleging violation of the
Genetic Information Privacy Act shall apply to genetic analysis whenever performed and
genetic information and gene products whenever obtained). Virginia reenacted, with
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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content and scope of these statutes vary widely. Some statutes still apply only
to specific diseases,8 8 while most apply to genetic information more generally. 89
Some statutes regulate the use of genetic information only in insurance" or in
both insurance and employment. 9' Most statutes pertain only to health
insurance,92 but a few also apply to health and life insurance,93 and sometimes
also to disability insurance.' It is common for the term "genetic information"
or "genetic test" to be defined as excluding routine physical tests and other
measurements, and many statutes by their terms do not regulate insurers' use of
family or personal medical history.95 A few more recent legislative enactments

some amendments, a statute which had expired in 1998. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2508.4 (Michie 1999); Act of Mar. 28, 1999, Va. Acts ch.789 (amending VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.2-3431 (Michie 1999)); Act of April 7, 1999, 1999 Va. Acts ch.1004 (amending VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-3430.2, -3430.3, -3430.8, -3431, -3432.3, -3514.1 (Michie 1999));
Act of Mar. 29, 1999, 1999 Va. Acts ch. 815 (amending VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3431
(Michie 1999)).
88. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.9706, .9707 (West 1996) (no insurer may
discriminate on the basis of applicant having sickle cell trait); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22:652.1 (West 1995) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-58-25 (1994) (same plus
hemoglobin C); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-207 (Supp. 1997) (same as North Carolina).
89. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448 (West Supp. 1999) (insurers not to
consider "genetic condition"); CAL. INS. CODE § 10140 (West Supp. 1999) (insurer not
to discriminate against person carrying a gene which may be associated with a disability);
Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-508.4 (Michie 1999) (insurer not to consider "genetic
information").
90. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 33-54-1 to 33-54-8 (1996); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-909 (Supp. 1999).
91. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448 (West Supp. 1999) (insurance);
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463 (West Supp. 1999) (employment); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 38a-816 (West Supp. 1999) (insurance); CONN. GENN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60
(West Supp. 1999) (employment); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2317 (Supp. 1998)
(insurance); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (Supp. 1998) (employment).
92. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-54-1, -8 (1996) (prohibiting genetic
information to be used in health insurance); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 141-H:1 to -H:6
(Supp. 1999) (health insurer may not require genetic testing or make issuance of policy
dependent on result of genetic test); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-909 (Supp. 1999) (same).
93. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-448, -1051 (West Supp. 1999) (unfair
trade practice to consider genetic condition in issuing a life and/or health insurance
policy); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2612 (McKinney 1999) (genetics not to be considered by
insurer of any type of insurance policy); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4724 (1999) (same).
94. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7 (West 1999) (prohibiting
health and disability income underwriters from either seeking genetic information or
using it to deny health or disability income insurance); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A,
§ 2159-C (West Supp. 1999) (disability insurers may not discriminate based on results
of genetic test); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12 (West Supp. 1998) (insurer may not
discriminate based on genetic information in issuing disability policy).
95. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 58-3-215 (West 1999) (defining genetic test
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define "genetic information" more broadly to include information from any
source relating to genetic characteristics, which embraces medical histories and,
presumably, some results of routine medical examinations. 96 Most statutes are
designed to limit the use of genetic tests and information,97 but others also
include some general genetic privacy provisions with applicability beyond
insurance. 8 Most prohibit the use of genetic information to discriminate against
an individual or group. 99 This more common formulation does not expressly
prohibit an individual voluntarily providing the insurer with the good results of
genetic tests so that the insurer may discriminate in favor of the applicant or
insured."° Some statutes give the greatest attention to preserving the privacy of

in terms of "laboratory test of human DNA, RNA, or chromosomes that is used to
identify the presence or absence of alterations in genetic material'); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
627.4301 (West Supp. 1999) (defining "genetic information" as excluding routine
physical examinations and chemical, blood, or urine tests; also as excluding questions
about family history); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-2 (Michie 1996) (excluding "routine
physical measurements; chemical, blood, and urine analysis; tests for abuse of drugs; and
tests for [HIV]" from scope of "genetic testing"); MD. CODE. ANN., INS. § 27-909 (Supp.
1999) (defining "genetic test" as "laboratory test of human chromosomes or DNA");
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.139 (West 1999) (defining "genetic test" as "presymptomatic
test of a person's genes, gene products or chromosomes," and excluding "cholesterol test
or other test not conducted for the purpose of determining the presence or absence of a
person's gene or genes"); NEv. REV. STAT. § 689C.198 (1997) (defining "genetic test"
in terms of diagnostic test for DNA); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-215 (Supp. 1999) (accord
with Georgia).
97. See, e.g., S.B. 1165, 44th Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 1999) (genetic information
includes information obtained from laboratory tests, physical medical exams, family
histories, and direct analysis of genes); H.B. 1685, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1999)
(genetic information to include information derived from laboratory tests, physical
medical exams, family histories, requests for genetic testing).
97. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7 (West 1999) (also limits use
of information in research); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-3 (1996) (genetic testing may only
be conducted to obtain information for therapeutic or diagnosed purposes); 410 ILL.
CoMp. STAT. ANN. 513/20 (West 1997) (genetic information must be used for therapeutic
purpose as it relates to accident and health insurance).
98. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §10148 (West Supp. 1999) (genetic tests must
comply with both informed consent and privacy provisions); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-3
(Michie 1996) (same); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 513/15 (West 1997) (Genetic
Information Privacy Act); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-5 (Michie Supp. 1999) (Genetic

Information Privacy Act).
99. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-53-2(b) (Supp. 1999) (health plan may not use
genetic information showing predisposition for cancer "to otherwise discriminate
against" a person); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2159-C (West Supp. 1998) (insurer
"may not discriminate against an individual or eligible dependent" on the basis of genetic
information); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12(e)(1) (West 1996) ("No person shall
discriminate against any individual on the basis of genetic information ....).
100. In addition, some states, including Missouri, explicitly authorize the insurer
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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genetic information,"' but some statutes contain considerable detail on the
consequences of misuse of genetic information. 2
III. THE NARRATIVE REVISITED: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
As the narrative in Part I demonstrated, the extent to which genetic
information is known and its implications understood is highly relevant to the
terms on which individuals will demand insurance. If particular persons are
identified as genetically risky, they will be excluded from health (and life and
disability) insurance pools, and this result will be favored by those who are or
believe themselves to be genetically advantaged. If, however, the genetic
information and its significance is not revealed or understood, individuals will
support an arrangement under which everyone substitutes a smaller, predictable
commitment in exchange for the ability to draw upon the collective for the
expense of genetic illnesses.
This juncture in the narrative symbolizes where America now finds itself
with respect to genetic information about health conditions. It is known that all
people have genetic defects and that some are serious.' 3 But, at least for now,
genetic testing is both novel and expensive; relatively few people have had
genetic tests, and few applicants for insurance have genetic test results to
report."° But this environment could change. As the cost of genetic testing
technology declines and such examinations become both more widely available
and more frequently administered, society may find itself in a situation where
such information is widely accessible. 0 5 In these circumstances, it will be more
difficult to strike a deal under which all persons share in the costs of caring for
those whose genetic defects lead to illness. The regulatory response at both the
federal and state levels of government described in Part II can be understood as
an effort to prevent the realization of the circumstances that will impede the
formation of broad health care communities.1 6 Through the maintenance of the

to consider information voluntarily submitted by the insured. See supranote 29.
101. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7 (West 1999) (information

gathered via genetic testing is confidential and privileged); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-3
(1996) (information derived from genetic testing shall be confidential and privileged);
HAW. REv. STAT. § 431:10A-1 18 (1998) (no insurer may disclose an individual's or a
family member's genetic information without the written consent of the person affected).
102. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.17 (West Supp. 1999); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW
§ 79-1 (McKinney Supp. 1999).
103. See supra notes 11-12.
104. See Hall, supra note 7,manuscript at 37 (noting that genetic tests have only
"recently come into clinical use").
105. See supra note 31.
106. "[T]his treatment of genetic conditions by insurance law. . . is illustrative of
a modem resolution of the historical insurance debate between individual responsibility
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss4/1
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confidentiality of genetic information and prohibitions on the use of such
information by insurers, low-risk insureds are foreclosed from demanding
favorable treatment in low-risk, homogeneous pools.
Missouri's approach to creating the conditions necessary for an optimal deal
is imperfect; it allows those with favorable genetic profiles to seek favorable
treatment from insurers. 10 7 To that extent, then, Missouri's legislature has not
fully embraced communitarian logic and has endorsed, by allowing the forces
of proverse selection to operate, the creation of homogeneous communities that
include low-risk individuals and exclude those with higher risks. Whether such
segmentation will ever occur, however, is doubtful. Until genetic testing
becomes less expensive and more widespread, low-risk persons cannot avail
themselves of the consensual disclosure option and thereby achieve more
favorable insurance terms. Furthermore, it is possible that more expansive
federal regulation will subsume this entire issue, or that efforts to preserve
underwriting practices that depend on the identification of individual health
characteristics will succumb to an incremental, evolutionary process eventually
culminating in universal, comprehensive coverage. Thus, the problem of
proverse selection may be more theoretical than real; of course, given that
insurers do not presently use genetic tests to segment risk pools, it might also be
that the problem of genetic discrimination in insurance is itself more theoretical
than real.
The fact remains, however, that Missouri, a substantial majority of other

states, and Congress have articulated compelling, if largely symbolic, statements
opposing genetic discrimination and favoring broad-based pooling of risks in
which neither coverage nor price shall turn on a person's genetic predisposition
to adverse health outcomes and their associated costs. These pronouncements

should caution any insurer or health plan contemplating increased use of
individual characteristics of any sort in underwriting decisions. 0 8 At the same

and autonomy on the one hand, and social solidarity on the other.... [L]egislatures are
opting to apply principles of social solidarity. It is inescapable that the genetic
underwriting statutes are motivated by an impulse to socialize risk." Jacobi, supra note
80, at 336; see also Hall, supra note 7, manuscript at 32-37 (documenting that some
health insurers would be interested in using genetic information in underwriting if the
legal climate allowed it).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31; see also Hall, supra note 7,
manuscript at 44-46 (reporting examples of individuals using genetic information to
negate inferences from adverse family history).
108. Professor Hall suggests that the statutes may have already had this effect.
"Even though insurers and agents do not have widespread and accurate knowledge of
these laws, these laws have fortified their impression and social disapproval by creating
a general climate of legal condemnation.... To this extent, they have been effective."
Hall, supra note 7, manuscript at 50. On the other hand, Professor Hall allows that the
statutes may have increased unfounded fears of genetic discrimination and thereby
induced more people to forego beneficial genetic testing, thereby creating a difficult
public policy dilemma. See Hall, supra note 7, manuscript at 50-5 1.
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time, the regulatory array represents an additional step in America's slow,
incremental trek toward compulsory, community-based rating practices in health
insurance. 19

109. See Jacobi, supra note 80, at 404 (recognizing that the "trend of regulatory
involvement in the market of health coverage has shifted toward favoring a social
pooling of risk ... to reach gradually and economically the goal of universal health
coverage"); M. Susan Ridgely & Howard H. Goldman, Puttingthe "Failure"ofNational
Health Care Reform in Perspective: Mental Health Benefits and the "Benefit" of
Incrementalism, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 407, 420 (1996) ("[M]any of those who favored
national universal health insurance believe the last opportunity to achieve it may have
been squandered.... [But] [i]ncremental steps in their own right can achieve significant
changes"); Flint J. Wainess, The Ways and Means ofNationalHealth CareReform, 1974
and Beyond, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & LAW 305, 329 (1999) (stating that "incremental
expansions of Medicare could prove politically popular, and could open up a back door
to universal national health insurance").
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